Violent extremist tactics and the ideology of the far left by Allington, Daniel et al.
Allington, Daniel; McAndrew, Siobhan and Hirsh, David. 2019. Violent extremist tactics and the
ideology of the far left. Technical Report. Commission for Countering Extremism, London. [Report]
http://research.gold.ac.uk/26698/
The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please
go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact
the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address:
gro@gold.ac.uk.
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For
more information, please contact the GRO team: gro@gold.ac.uk

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2019 Daniel Allington, Siobhan McAndrew, and David Hirsh  
  
About the authors 
Daniel Allington is Senior Lecturer in Social and Cultural Artificial Intelligence at King’s 
College London and Deputy Editor of Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism. 
Siobhan McAndrew is Lecturer in Sociology with Quantitative Research Methods at the 
University of Bristol. 
David Hirsh is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London and the 
author of Law against genocide: cosmopolitan trials (Glasshouse Press, 2003) and 
Contemporary left antisemitism (Routledge, 2017). 
Acknowledgements 
The fieldwork for this study was funded with a grant from the UK Commission for 
Countering Extremism, which also arranged for independent expert peer review of the 
research and for online publication of the current document. The Commission had no role in 
the design and conduct of the research. 
  
  
 
 
  
  
Table of contents 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Definitions: what the sectarian far left is ...................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Ideologies: what the sectarian far left believes ............................................................................. 2 
1.3 Tactics: what the sectarian far left does ........................................................................................ 4 
1.4 Violent extremism and the sectarian far left ................................................................................. 6 
1.5 Review of existing research .......................................................................................................... 7 
1.6 Hypotheses .................................................................................................................................... 8 
2. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 9 
2.1 Stage one: formulation of statements representing current far-left ideology ............................... 9 
2.2 Stage two: survey of ‘very left-wing’ British adults ................................................................... 10 
2.3 Stage three: nationally-representative survey of British adults .................................................. 11 
2.4 Stage four: analysis ..................................................................................................................... 12 
2.5 Technical note ............................................................................................................................. 12 
3. Measuring revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent extremism ......................... 13 
3.1 Piloting and factor analysis of new questionnaire items ............................................................. 13 
3.2 The revolutionary workerist and modified SyFoR inventories ................................................... 16 
4. Description of samples ......................................................................................................... 18 
4.1 The characteristics of the ‘very left-wing’ .................................................................................. 18 
4.2 Explicit indicators of support for radical politics within the general population ....................... 19 
5. Revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent extremism across both samples ......... 23 
5.1 Reliability of measures and distribution of scores ...................................................................... 23 
5.2 Levels of revolutionary workerism ............................................................................................. 24 
5.3 Levels of sympathy for violent extremism ................................................................................. 24 
6. Sympathy for violent extremism by geopolitical outlook ..................................................... 26 
7. Sympathy for violent extremism by revolutionary workerism .............................................. 28 
8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 31 
References ................................................................................................................................ 33 
 
  
  
List of figures 
Figure 1: Agreement with statements expressing aspects of the ideology of the sectarian far 
left (‘very left-wing’ sample) ................................................................................................... 14 
Figure 2: Correlations between statements (‘very left-wing’ sample) ..................................... 15 
Figure 3: Scree plot of factors explaining variance in agreement with statements (‘very left-
wing’ sample) ........................................................................................................................... 15 
Figure 4: Left-right political identity (nationally-representative omnibus sample) ................. 20 
Figure 5: Views of ‘revolutionary socialist’ and ‘British nationalist’ groups (nationally-
representative omnibus sample) ............................................................................................... 21 
Figure 6: Views of ‘private sector’ and ‘profit-making’ companies (nationally-representative 
omnibus sample) ...................................................................................................................... 22 
Figure 7: Revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent extremism by sample ............. 23 
Figure 8: Percentage chance of sympathising and observed proportion of sympathisers by 
level of revolutionary workerism ............................................................................................. 30 
 
  
  
List of tables 
Table 1: Statements reflecting aspects of the ideology of the sectarian far left ...................... 14 
Table 2: Factor loadings (‘very left-wing’ sample) ................................................................. 16 
Table 3: Revolutionary workerist inventory ............................................................................ 17 
Table 4: Modified SyFoR inventory (adapted from Bhui, Warfa, and Jones 2014) ................ 17 
Table 5: Demographic characteristics of the ‘very left-wing’ and nationally-representative 
omnibus samples ...................................................................................................................... 19 
Table 6: Left-right political identity (nationally-representative omnibus sample) .................. 20 
Table 7: Views of ‘revolutionary socialist’ and ‘British nationalist’ groups (nationally-
representative omnibus sample) ............................................................................................... 21 
Table 8: Views of ‘private sector’ and ‘profit-making’ companies (nationally-representative 
omnibus sample) ...................................................................................................................... 22 
Table 9: Revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent extremism (‘very left-wing’ 
sample) ..................................................................................................................................... 23 
Table 10: Revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent extremism (nationally-
representative omnibus sample) ............................................................................................... 23 
Table 11: Comparison of samples by individuals expressing sympathy with at least one form 
of violent extremism ................................................................................................................ 25 
Table 12: Countries regarded as ‘greatest threat to world peace’ (‘very left-wing’ sample) .. 27 
Table 13: Countries regarded as ‘greatest threat to world peace’ (nationally-representative 
omnibus sample) ...................................................................................................................... 27 
Table 14: Comparison of sympathisers and non-sympathisers, SyFoR 1-6 ............................ 28 
Table 15: Comparison of sympathisers and non-sympathisers, SyFoR 3-5 ............................ 28 
Table 16: Regression coefficients, SyFoR 1-6 ........................................................................ 29 
Table 17: Regression coefficients, SyFoR 3-5 ........................................................................ 29 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 1 
Violent extremist tactics and the ideology 
of the sectarian far left 
Daniel Allington (King’s College London) 
Siobhan McAndrew (University of Bristol) 
David Hirsh (Goldsmiths, University of London) 
Published 19 July 2019 
Abstract 
This study addresses the question of whether a relationship exists between sympathy for 
violent extremism and openness to ideological positions associated with the revolutionary far 
left. We begin by analysing the characteristics of British far-left sectarian groups: that is, 
small, ideologically homogeneous organisations, each of which rejects parliamentary politics 
as a route to socialism and instead aspires to become the ‘vanguard party’ of Leninist 
revolutionary theory. We distinguish the members of such groups from members of the 
public who identify as ‘very left-wing’. We then develop a survey instrument derived from 
publications by sectarian far-left groups and pilot it on a stratified random sample of the self-
identified ‘very left-wing’ (N = 1073). The data collected is then re-used as a boost sample 
for a nationally-representative sample of the British public (N = 3823). Using these data, we 
test the hypothesis of a positive association between the belief system disseminated by the 
sectarian far left – which we term ‘revolutionary workerism’ – and sympathy with violent 
extremist tactics. We find a relationship which is highly significant in both statistical and 
substantive terms: those who express strong agreement with revolutionary workerist ideas are 
far more likely to express sympathy with violent extremist tactics than those who express 
strong disagreement. We also find a positive relationship between sympathy for violent 
extremism and a geopolitical outlook resembling the ‘anti-imperialist’ ideology promoted by 
the sectarian far left, in that those who see the US and the UK (and, among the ‘very left-
wing’, also Israel) as a greater threat to world peace than NATO strategic adversaries such as 
North Korea tend to be more sympathetic to violent extremism than those who do not. 
1. Introduction 
Our purpose in this study is to examine the relationship between radical left-wing ideology 
and sympathy for violent extremism. The British ‘communist’ or ‘revolutionary socialist’ far 
left has shown little evidence of organising political violence in recent years. However, we 
argue that the objective of revolution and the construction of narratives in which certain 
social groups are positioned as the enemy of the majority, as well as the categorisation of the 
UK and its allies as a threat to world peace, can potentially act to legitimate certain forms of 
violence when carried out in the UK. Accordingly, we use survey data (a) to measure 
sympathy for violent extremism and adherence to ideological viewpoints similar to those 
promoted by revolutionary left-wing groups and (b) to test the hypothesis of a positive 
relationship between the two. This work forms a complement to recent academic studies of 
the radical right (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014). 
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1.1 Definitions: what the sectarian far left is 
The British far left has historically been comprised of a number of small, highly committed, 
ideologically homogeneous groups, most of which have conventionally been categorised as 
‘Trotskyist’, ‘Stalinist’, or ‘Maoist’. This division depends on lineage and corresponds only 
weakly with actual patterns of ideological differences between groups. Following Stephen 
Rayner’s (1979) analysis of such groups as akin to religious sects, we refer to them 
collectively as the ‘sectarian’ far left. This term is used as it precisely identifies our object of 
study, distinguishing it from superficially similar organisations such as radical green and 
anarchist groups, as well as from ‘new social movements’ built around identity politics and 
from much looser groupings such as grassroots communities of supporters of left-wing 
parliamentary politicians. Although there is diversity between individual sectarian far-left 
groups, most of them hold three ideological tendencies in common.  
1.2 Ideologies: what the sectarian far left believes 
Vanguardism is the core ideology of the sectarian far left. Most influentially expressed by 
Vladimir Lenin in What is to be done? (1988 [1902]), it is a belief system structured around 
the ambition to replace the current social, economic, and political system with ‘communism’. 
This is conceived as an ideal mode of existence in which there are no class differences, no 
state, and no market economy. Vanguardism is distinguished from related forms of radical 
left wing ideology by the idea that, while history inevitably moves towards communism, it 
will be able to reach that destination only after the workers have been led into a mass 
uprising by an elite cadre of professional revolutionaries, initiating a transitional phase 
known as ‘socialism’ or ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’. Vanguardists do not take up arms 
against the state, because their long-term strategy is the weaponisation of the working class 
itself. They implicitly conceive contemporary society as a conspiracy against the workers (in 
contradiction of Marx; see Popper 1969, p. 125), and for that reason attempt conspiracies of 
their own: ultimately, to bring down the state and seize control of industry, but, in the shorter 
term, to take control of non-radical organisations in order to radicalise their members. 
There would appear to be a contradiction at the heart of vanguardism. Revolution is 
understood both as the predestined self-liberation of the working class and as achievable only 
through the intervention of an elite leadership. Lenin, for example, argued that ‘[t]he 
teachings of socialism… grew out of… philosophic, historical, and economic theories 
elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by the intelligentsia’ and 
therefore ‘could only have been brought to [the workers] from without’ because ‘the working 
class exclusively by its own effort is able to develop only trade-union consciousness’ (1988 
[1902], p. 98). The self-appointed task of sectarian far-left groups is thus to persuade the 
workers to accept their leadership. Small as they are, they would seem to have only the 
remotest chances of success. But, just as religious sects ‘invok[e] notions of the “elect”’ and 
faith in God in order to legitimate themselves, sectarian far-left groups invoke parallel 
‘notions of the role of the “vanguard party” which will usher in the new order’ and ‘faith in 
the proletariat once it has been purged of the pollution of bourgeois ideology and saved from 
incorrect, or at worst, traitorous leadership’ (Rayner 1979, p. 99).  
In addition to vanguardism, most sectarian far-left groups also adhere to a subsidiary 
ideology known as ‘anti-imperialism’. In a sectarian far-left context, this term does not refer 
to a general policy of opposition to imperialism as usually understood – that is, as the control 
of one country by another. Imperialism in that sense can be opposed from many different 
ideological perspectives, and not only from those of the sectarian far left. The ‘anti-
imperialist’ ideology adopted by most sectarian far-left groups rests on a highly specific 
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understanding of what the word ‘imperialism’ means. For that reason, we use the term ‘anti-
imperialism’ in quotation marks throughout this study.  
‘Anti-imperialism’ in this sense derives from a political and economic theory formulated in 
John Hobson’s Imperialism: a study (1902) and further developed by Lenin in Imperialism: 
the highest stage of capitalism (2010 [1916]). Hobson’s ideas grew out of nineteenth century 
antisemitic conspiracy theory. He attacked ‘not colonialism in general, but what he saw as its 
debasement from the 1880s as Britain, France, Germany and the United States extended their 
rule to the tropics’ under the influence of so-called ‘international financiers’, whom Hobson 
asserted to be Jewish (Feldman 2019, n.p.). Lenin (2010 [1916]) integrated Hobson’s ideas 
into his own theories about the impending collapse of capitalism, maintaining that a small 
number of creditor or ‘usurer’ nations now held the rest of the world in debt slavery, waging 
war in order to protect or extend their monopolies. ‘Anti-imperialism’ of this type justified 
Soviet support for national liberation movements outside the Soviet bloc, even if the leaders 
of those movements were nationalists with overt bourgeois or even fascist tendencies (see 
Shindler 2012, pp. 60-62, 73-76, and 140-141). By contrast, national liberation movements 
within the Soviet bloc were brutally suppressed (see e.g. Bociurkiw 1974). 
In the post-colonial era, ‘anti-imperialism’ has come to be defined primarily in terms of an 
over-riding opposition to the US and its allies (see Rich 2018 [2016], pp. 14-17, Bolton and 
Pitts 2018, pp. 78-83, and Hirsh 2018, p. 196). It is this principle which forms the ideological 
basis for what is known as the ‘anti-war movement’ in contemporary Britain (see Cohen 
2007, pp. 280-311). This is not a pacifist movement but an ‘anti-imperialist’ movement, and, 
as such, does not oppose military action tout court. For example, it never protests against 
military action carried out by or on behalf of strategic adversaries of the US such as Russia 
and Iran. That is because those countries are not counted among the great exporters of capital. 
When such countries exercise influence beyond their borders, including through military 
action, they are therefore seen as resisting, rather than embodying, ‘imperialism’. 
Accordingly, the ‘anti-war movement’ instead organises demonstrations exclusively against 
the US and its allies, especially Israel and the UK, whose governments are conceived as 
acting on behalf of the financial powers at the centre of the usurious ‘imperialist’ system that 
the sectarian far left understands to be the real threat to world peace. At its most extreme, this 
theory reduces to the idea that, while there may appear to be many different wars, separate 
both in time and in space, there is in reality only one continuous war: the war that 
‘imperialists’ wage on ‘the oppressed’. Some on the far left adopt a much more sophisticated 
analysis. But for most sectarian far-left groups, being ‘anti-war’ equates simply to solidarity 
with anyone who is currently at war with a NATO member or ally. 
Lastly, most sectarian far-left British groups additionally subscribe to an ideology of ‘anti-
fascism’. As with ‘anti-imperialism’, this term does not refer to a general policy of opposition 
to fascism as usually understood, and as such, it too shall be used in quotation marks 
throughout this study. It is likely that most British adults are anti-fascist in the broad sense 
that they reject the ideology of fascism. By contrast, the sectarian far left’s ‘anti-fascism’ is 
an ideology in its own right – and one that rests on highly specific and not widely shared 
understandings of what fascism is, and why it should be opposed. From the 1920s, the official 
position of the Communist International was that what we would now term the ‘social 
democratic’ governments of the day were in reality ‘social fascist’ and therefore no better 
than the openly fascist Italian government of Benito Mussolini. From the beginning of the 
1930s, this position was opposed by the exiled former Soviet politician and military leader 
Leon Trotsky, who recognised fascism as a unique threat that the communist leaders of the 
day were abetting, in part through their refusal to co-ordinate with social democrats (Trotsky 
1971 [1931]). But even Trotsky had difficulty understanding that antisemitism and racism 
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were key organising principles for fascism – especially in Germany, where the Nazis saw the 
Jews not as mere scapegoats but as an enemy whose destruction was an end in itself (see 
Goldhagen 1996 and Herf 2006 on the relationship of antisemitism to German fascism and 
Wistrich 1976, p. 175 on Trotsky’s incomplete recognition of its importance). Moreover, 
Trotsky’s understanding of fascism only as a doomed strategy employed by financiers to save 
the capitalist system in its moribund final stages led him both to minimise differences 
between it and social democracy (see e.g. Trotsky 1971 [1934], p. 579) and to look forward 
to the ‘immediate revolutionary situation’ that he imagined would necessarily follow the 
supposedly inevitable internal collapse of the Nazi regime (Trotsky 1971 [1933], pp. 544-
545). As war between the Axis and the Allied powers drew nearer, Trotsky chose ‘proletarian 
defeatism’ over collaboration with ‘imperialists’ (Wistrich 1976, p. 179) – even before the 
Hitler-Stalin pact turned the Communist Party of Great Britain against the Allied war effort.  
Growing from these roots, the sectarian far left’s ‘anti-fascism’ is a far cry from the anti-
fascism of mainstream anti-racist organisations. It is an ideology which sees the problem of 
fascism primarily in terms of the obstacle that fascist organisations supposedly place on the 
path to otherwise inevitable proletarian revolution. This conviction is behind the emphasis 
that some sectarian far-left groups have placed on street-level confrontations with their 
counterparts on the far right, and explains many of their theoretical statements on fascism: for 
example, the assertion of ‘[w]orkers’ control of society and industry as the only alternative to 
fascism’ (this being the fourth of the International Socialists’ four principles for unity among 
revolutionary socialist organisations, quoted in Rayner 1979, p. 220; emphasis added). 
Together with the assumption that antisemitism is merely an aspect of fascism, the far left’s 
ideological ‘anti-fascism’ underpins the widespread left-wing conviction that anyone on the 
left is by definition not antisemitic (Rich 2018 [2016], pp. 197-198) – despite the long history 
of left-wing antisemitism (Fine and Spencer 2017) and despite the practical difficulty that 
many on the left evidently still face in distinguishing ‘far-left’ from ‘far-right’ discourse on 
topics such as Zionism and usury (Allington 2018). 
1.3 Tactics: what the sectarian far left does 
The long-term objective of contemporary sectarian far-left groups is to lead the proletariat 
into revolution. However, there is no realistic possibility of that goal being achieved by any 
such group in the foreseeable future. This means that sectarian far-left groups should 
primarily be understood in terms of their short- and medium-term objectives of recruiting and 
indoctrinating members and ‘building the movement’ – which in practice usually means 
achieving influence over non-radical organisations. With revolution a distant goal, the tactics 
currently employed by a typical far-left sectarian group in the UK are orientated towards 
those short- and medium-term objectives, and can be summarised as follows: 
a) Producing and distributing publications that reflect the group’s specific ideology and 
promote its activities 
b) Proselytising among non-members 
c) Organising and co-opting strikes and protests in search of opportunities for (a) and (b) 
d) Using reward mechanisms and ‘political education’ to reinforce conformity within the 
group 
e) Campaigning to embed group members within the bureaucratic hierarchy of 
organisations such as trade unions, single-issue campaigning groups, students’ unions, 
tenants’ associations, and conventional political parties 
It has been observed that some on the British left have ‘g[iven] up on the revolutionary 
potential of the western working class’ (Rich 2018 [2016], p. 14). But on the sectarian far 
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left, this goes no further than a change of emphasis for outreach purposes. As the leading 
theorist of Britain’s largest Trotskyist group writes, ‘[i]n the absence, alas, of large-scale 
workers’ struggles, movements [against war and fascism] have provided the soil in which 
new generations of socialists have been nurtured’ (Callinicos 2019, p. 6). ‘Anti-war’ and 
‘anti-fascist’ movements are thus assumed to have wider appeal than overt calls for a 
workers’ uprising. But if those who are inspired to take part in such movements can 
eventually be persuaded to understand ‘war’ and ‘fascism’ in a Leninist or Trotskyist 
framework, then it may be possible to draw them into support for proletarian revolution. This 
is a contemporary twist on a classic recipe for radicalisation: leading people to see their 
specific complaints as impossible to address without total overthrow of the social order. As 
Lenin wrote, ‘we must make it our concern to direct the thoughts of those who are 
dissatisfied only with conditions at the university or in the zemstvo, etc, to the idea that the 
entire political system is worthless’ (1988 [1902], p. 149).1 
Similar calculations would appear to lie behind the veneer of support that most sectarian far-
left groups offer the current Labour Party leadership, despite their fundamental commitment 
to the idea that socialism and communism can only be achieved through extra-parliamentary 
means. The strategy appears to be for sectarian groups to express public support for left-wing 
politicians in order to radicalise those politicians’ other supporters, popularise their own 
ideas, and build the networks of influence through which they eventually hope to lead the 
workers into revolt. For example, at the time of Jeremy Corbyn’s first leadership campaign, 
the Alliance for Workers Liberty stated that ‘[a] Labour government… could not implement 
socialism if it wanted to’ and argued that engagement in that campaign should instead be 
viewed primarily as an opportunity to ‘renew socialist political ideas’ (Solidarity 2015, p. 5). 
Similar statements have been made by other sectarian far-left groups. On 2 March 2019, a 
unanimously agreed resolution of the Communist Party of Great Britain (Provisional Central 
Committee) presented the Labour leader and his supporters somewhat negatively, decrying 
their ‘vague notions of the spirit of 1945, Keynesian economics, and a Corbyn-led 
government ushering in equality, prosperity, and peace’, but concluding on the positive note 
that ‘once again, Marxists have a real opportunity to gain a wide hearing’ as a side effect of 
developments within the Labour Party (CPGB-PCC 2019, p. 10). A speaker at the same 
meeting noted that other sectarian far-left groups such as the Socialist Workers Party were 
already ‘hoping to win recruits from “disillusioned Corbynites”’ (Manson 2019, p.11). Again, 
the model for this tactic is to be found in the works of Lenin: 
At present, it is often difficult for the British Communists even to approach the 
masses, even to make themselves heard. But if I address the masses as a Communist, 
and invite them to vote for [Labour MP Arthur] Henderson… I most certainly will be 
listened to. And being listened to, I shall be able to popularise the idea, not only that 
Soviets are better than Parliaments… but also that I am prepared to support 
Henderson by my vote in just the same way as a rope supports the man who has 
hanged himself. 
Lenin 1921 [1920], p.86 
It could be argued that the tactics described in this section may cause certain forms of social 
harm in their own right: for example, by interfering in the normal functioning of institutions 
created for another purpose. Our primary focus in this study, however, is on the ideology 
which the sectarian far left disseminates in the course of its activities, and on the relationship 
of that ideology to violent extremism. 
 
1 A zemstvo was a local government unit in pre-revolutionary Russia. 
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1.4 Violent extremism and the sectarian far left 
If sectarian groups on the British far left are to be considered extremist at the present time, 
this cannot be on grounds of any realistic prospect of their direct organisational involvement 
in any sort of imminent terrorist activity in the UK. Unlike far-left groups in some other 
European nations (see e.g. Weinberg and Eubank 1988, Kraushaar 2005), extant sectarian 
groups on the British far left have no history of using terrorist tactics in the hope of 
precipitating revolution. Furthermore, they do not engage in the ‘performative violence’ 
associated with some newer and more ideologically heterogeneous formations on the far left 
(see Juris 2005), and for the most part they no longer issue calls for violence of the kind that 
were made by some of their number in connection with Britain’s inner city riots of 1981 
(Shipley 1981, pp. 196-197) and that were systematically identified in a recent study of far-
left propaganda distributed during the Greek riots of 2008 (see Gerodimos 2015).  
However, the ideology of ‘anti-imperialism’ draws sectarian far-left groups, as well as their 
fellow-travellers across the broader left, into a position of solidarity with terrorist 
organisations and violently repressive regimes – especially if those organisations and regimes 
are actively engaged in military struggle against the US and its allies, including the UK (see 
Hirsh 2018, pp. 58-65). Although such solidarity does not currently extend to direct 
involvement in armed conflict, it has often been expressed through rationalisation of Islamist 
and (previously) Irish Republican terror attacks in Britain, usually by interpreting such 
atrocities within an ‘anti-imperialist’ framework that enables them to be presented as the 
result of British government policy. This is a specific example of the general tendency of 
western ‘anti-imperialists’ to project their own politics onto those who organise and carry out 
terrorist acts (Postone 2006, p. 97). For example, the weekly newspaper of the Socialist 
Workers Party responded to the London transport bombings of 2005 with the front-page 
headline ‘This is about Iraq, Mr Blair’ (Socialist Worker 2005, p. 1), as well as with an article 
arguing that if Britain wants terrorist attacks to stop, then it should begin by ‘ending the 
occupation of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine’ (Yaqoob 2005, n.p.).2 To clarify the implied 
ideological point, the same issue of the newspaper featured a cartoon depicting the Circle 
underground line (on which two of the bombings had taken place) as a vicious circle in which 
‘empire’ leads to ‘terror’ via ‘poverty’ and ultimately back to ‘empire’ via ‘war’ (Tim 2005, 
n.p.). These are absolutely standard arguments that will be familiar to anyone who has had 
contact with the sectarian far left. 
Moreover, while not all sectarian far-left groups are committed to ‘anti-imperialism’, the core 
long-term objectives of the sectarian far left require willingness to engage in political 
violence at some point in the future. Accordingly, sectarian far-left groups tend to interpret 
public order incidents, rioting, clashes with police, etc in a positive light (see e.g. Lewis-
Griffiths and Kimber’s 2019 coverage of the ‘yellow vest’ movement in France). This 
follows from the vanguardist belief that a positive transformation of society can and must be 
achieved through overthrow of all existing institutions, and from the acknowledgement that 
such an overthrow is at some stage likely to involve violent conflict between those who 
support the revolution and the ‘counter-revolutionary’ forces to which they will find 
themselves opposed. Sectarian far-left groups therefore welcome expressions of militancy as 
 
2 The front-page headline was a quotation from a speaker at a public vigil organised by the Socialist Workers 
Party-linked Stop the War Coalition, while the article was written by an official from the same organisation. 
That official was also the vice-chair of the Respect party: a joint venture between the Socialist Workers Party 
and the Muslim Association of Britain, whose platform has been described as ‘an authentic representation of the 
SWP’s brand of Trotskyite ideology, with an admixture of Islamist tenets’ (Benedek 2007, n.p.). 
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a sign that the proletariat is advancing towards its destiny as the tool with which the 
revolutionary elite will ‘smash the state’ and destroy capitalism. 
To re-iterate, sectarian far-left groups in the UK do not directly promote violence. But 
openness to violent extremist tactics is logically required by a commitment to ‘revolution’ as 
such groups typically understand the word. As Trotsky declared, ‘[t]he man who repudiates 
terrorism in principle – i.e. repudiates measures of suppression and intimidation towards 
determined and armed counter-revolution – must reject all idea of the political supremacy of 
the working class and its revolutionary dictatorship’ (1922 [1920], p. 23). Once ‘good’ is 
identified with leading the workers into revolution and establishing the ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’, almost anything can be justified in the service of that goal. 
1.5 Review of existing research 
There is relatively little scholarly literature on the influence of the revolutionary far left in the 
UK. Recent cross-national studies have examined the ideological position of radical and far-
left parties and their support across Europe (March and Mudde 2005, March 2008, March 
2012, Peace, 2013, March and Rommerskirchen 2015, Gomez et al 2016, Fagerholm 2018), 
although some of the parties examined might more accurately be seen as populist than 
vanguardist (see Mudde 2004, pp. 549-550 on this key distinction). Further scholarship 
explores similarities between the extreme left and the extreme right (Rokeach 1960 and 
Bobbio 1996), and there is growing interest in how belief in conspiracy theories is associated 
with both left- and right-wing extremism (e.g. Prooijen et al 2015). 
Of more direct relevance to this study is a body of work within political psychology that 
addresses the question of whether particular personality types are attracted to right- or left-
wing extremism. The 1950s saw a surge of interest in the supposed ‘authoritarian personality’ 
as a hypothetical type with a psychological inclination towards fascism (Adorno et al 1950). 
However, the underlying research suffered from a somewhat partisan view of the relationship 
between authoritarianism and political position, which led to the neglect of left-wing 
authoritarian traditions such as communism (Shils 1954).3  
Two frames for understanding authoritarianism on the political left were opened up by the 
newer concept of ‘right-wing authoritarianism’, defined as an inclination to follow 
established norms, aggress towards those perceived as deviant, and submit to established 
authorities (Altemeyer 1980). Firstly, it was argued that ‘right-wing’ authoritarians in this 
psychological sense are not attracted to specifically right-wing authorities so much as to 
established authority per se, and as such will behave in the same way in communist societies, 
if that is where they happen to have lived their lives: following the (communist) norms, 
submitting to the established (communist) authorities, and aggressing towards those regarded 
(by communists) as deviant (Altemeyer 1996, p. 218; see McFarland et al 1992 and de Regt 
et al 2011 for empirical support for this idea). Secondly, it has been proposed that an exactly 
parallel ‘left-wing authoritarianism’ might also exist, characterised by ‘submission to 
authorities who are dedicated to overthrowing the established authorities’, ‘adherence to the 
norms of behaviour perceived to be endorsed by the revolutionary authorities’, and ‘general 
aggressiveness directed against the established authorities, or against persons who are 
perceived to support those authorities’ (Altemeyer 1996, p. 219; emphasis in original). On 
this definition, not only communists but also anarchists and members of anti-establishment 
 
3 For more on the biases of the original studies, see Martin (2001) – although it is noted that advocates of the 
idea of left-wing authoritarianism have in turn been accused of ‘centrist bias’ and ‘anticommunism’ (Stone and 
Smith 1992, p. 155). 
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right-wing groups such as the Posse Comitatus would be seen as psychologically left-wing, as 
left-wing authoritarianism is here defined not by adherence to any particular political 
programme but merely by an enthusiasm for overthrowing whichever authorities happen to 
be in power (Altemeyer 1996, p. 218). 
While the researcher who proposed the ‘left-wing authoritarianism’ concept recalled 
encountering members of Maoist groups who appeared to exhibit such tendencies in the 
1960s (Altemeyer 1996, p. 217), he found it impossible to identify pure left-wing 
authoritarians in convenience sample studies conducted in Canada from the 1990s onwards: 
what he found were, rather, individuals who exhibited both ‘right-wing’ and ‘left-wing’ 
authoritarian tendencies and who therefore might be considered to be ‘wild cards’ with the 
potential to attach themselves to conservative or revolutionary movements depending on the 
circumstances (Altemeyer 1996, pp. 220-230; Benjamin 2014 replicated this finding in the 
US). Be that as it may, a group of researchers in Belgium identified a large proportion of left-
wing authoritarians among the small number of participants whom they were able to recruit 
from radical left-wing groups (van Hiel et al 2006, pp. 784-785). As violence was not 
promoted openly even by the group to which the most authoritarian participants belonged, the 
researchers speculate that their high levels of authoritarian aggression were a consequence of 
‘infer[ing] the legitimacy of [violent] actions’ from the group’s depiction of the established 
authorities as ‘hostile, aggressive, and illegitimate’ (van Hiel at al 2006, p. 789). This is 
similar to our argument that, rather than directly promoting violence, British sectarian far-left 
groups instead promote ideologies that can potentially provide a viewpoint from which 
certain forms of violent extremism may appear justified. However, we take the view that such 
a viewpoint may also be available to non-members who adopt the same or similar ideologies. 
1.6 Hypotheses 
Given the above, we expect a positive relationship between sympathy for violent extremism 
and adherence to ideologies promoted by the sectarian far left. Those who view the world in 
terms resembling those of the sectarian far left’s ‘anti-imperialism’ are expected to have 
higher levels of sympathy for violent extremism. And the more completely an individual 
agrees with the ideology presented in sectarian far-left publications, the more likely it is 
expected to be that he or she will sympathise with at least some form of violent extremism. 
An ‘anti-imperialist’ worldview can be defined straightforwardly in terms of the countries an 
individual sees as a threat to world peace (see section 1.2, above), while a measure of 
agreement with the ideology of sectarian far-left publications did not exist prior to the 
research presented here and required creation as part of the research project (see sections 2.1 
and 3, below). These expectations furnish us with three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a. Those who choose the US, the UK, or Israel as greatest threats to world peace 
from a list that also includes Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran will have higher levels of 
sympathy for violent extremism than those who do not. 
Hypothesis 1b. Those who choose Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran as greatest threats to 
world peace from a list that also includes the US, the UK, and Israel will have lower levels of 
sympathy for violent extremism than those who do not. 
Hypothesis 2. Higher levels of agreement with the distinctive ideology promoted in sectarian 
far-left publications will be associated with higher probability of sympathising with violent 
extremism.  
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Stage one: formulation of statements representing current far-left ideology 
In the first stage of the project, the researchers selected recent articles from three platforms 
associated with the sectarian far left: the Socialist Worker, the Weekly Worker, and 
Counterfire. These articles were read closely, with the aim being to articulate recurrent 
general principles. 
Following a group discussion at which the articles were discussed, each researcher proposed 
statements expressing characteristic objectives, tactics, or items of ideology either identified 
from the publications under consideration or recalled from discussion with members of the 
far left (two of the researchers have extensive experience of qualitative research in this area, 
and one is a former Trotskyist activist). Statements were shortlisted through a voting process, 
with the top statements being scrutinised to see whether anything amongst them had been too 
closely duplicated or whether anything of importance had been left out; where this was 
considered to have happened, we returned to the publications and formulated more statements 
in discussion with one another. The process resulted in an agreed shortlist of 15 candidate 
items reflective of the tactics, objectives, and ideology of the British far left. 
The full list is given below in section 3.1, but an example will now be used to show how 
statements can be related to specific articles. It is a quotation from a Weekly Worker article in 
which the Chair of the Communist Party of Great Britain (Provisional Central Committee), 
known as Jack Conrad, responds to an article by former Labour Party strategist, John 
McTernan. Like many commentators at that time, McTernan (2019) was recognisably 
paraphrasing a recent and highly influential analysis of conspiracy theory as the link between 
antisemitism and contemporary left- and right-wing populism, with their characteristically 
‘personalised’ critique of social relations (Bolton and Pitts 2018). Rather than disavow this 
personalised critique, Conrad’s response asserts it to be ‘simply the truth’, and briefly 
elaborates on a conspiracy theory which is purported to explain the existence of McTernan’s 
article: 
McTernan says antisemitism ‘can be easily moulded into a critique of capitalism’. It 
only takes one more small step to classify anti-capitalism itself as inherently 
antisemitic. Towards that end, he cites rhetoric about the 1% and economic inequality 
as having ‘the same underlying theme – a small group of very rich people who 
cleverly manipulate others to defend their interests’. 
Once again, this is simply the truth. The capitalist class, a small minority, really do 
cleverly manipulate others to defend their interests. Paid lobbyists, the advertising-
funded media, donations to political parties and campaigns, hiring PR companies, 
obtaining non-disclosure orders, employing professionals such as John McTernan – 
all this is very expensive (but for the members of the capitalist class, well worth it). 
Conrad 2019, p. 9 
The above-quoted article could thus be identified with two themes that were also seen 
elsewhere within the left-wing publications that we examined: first, the idea that society is as 
it is because the wealthy have arranged it to their exclusive advantage, and second, the idea 
that what appears in the ‘mainstream’ media is a manipulative falsehood disseminated on that 
minority’s behalf. Our aim was to formulate highly general statements so that the resulting 
survey did not become a mere reflection of recent news topics. Thus we did not, for example, 
identify the purported lies of the ‘mainstream media’ with accusations of antisemitism against 
left-wing politicians and their supporters, even though that was the specific allegation not 
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only in the above but also in several similar articles, such as the Socialist Worker front page 
story which claimed that ‘[a] deluge of slurs on the left and Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn 
over antisemitism are designed to weaken those fighting for change and to marginalise the 
Palestinians’ (Socialist Worker 2019, p. 1).4 
The questionnaire items related to the above are ‘the wealthy make life worse for the rest of 
us’ (referred to below as fl.wealthy.worse) and ‘mainstream newspapers and TV channels tell 
lies to protect the ruling class’ (referred to below as fl.msm.lies). 
2.2 Stage two: survey of ‘very left-wing’ British adults 
In the second stage of research, the 15 new items were combined with several existing survey 
instruments to produce a questionnaire that was sent to a stratified random sample of self-
declared ‘very left-wing’ members of YouGov’s online panel. (Quotation marks are used 
when referring to this sample throughout this study to emphasise that the sampling frame 
consisted of people who categorised themselves as ‘very left-wing’, rather than people who 
would necessarily have been categorised as such on some objective measure.) For the 
purposes of this study, the most important existing instrument was comprised of five of the 
six items which loaded onto the first factor of the SyFoR or ‘sympathy for radicalism’ scale 
(Bhui, Warfa, and Jones 2014), all of which relate to violent extremism. A sixth item, which 
related to the specific tactic of suicide bombing, was excluded. This was left out because 
suicide bombing is a tactic specifically associated with Islamism, and as such might not be 
appropriate for surveying other target populations than that for which the instrument was 
originally developed. It was replaced with a new item, namely ‘street violence against anti-
democratic groups’. This new item was added because it relates both to the ‘squadist’ tactic 
of physical opposition to members of fascist groups (advocated by some on the far left as 
appropriate for the present historical moment) and to the imagined future necessity of 
defensive violence to protect the revolution against counter-revolutionary forces. The 
wording of the item does not specifically identify either of those antagonists, leaving 
interpretation to the respondent: we argue this enables it to remain a plausible measure of 
support for violence across the political spectrum, and not only on the left.5   
This resulted in a list of six items, each of which refers to a distinct form of violence or 
threatened violence in an implied context of political radicalism. Respondents were 
specifically asked for their level of sympathy with these forms of violent extremism ‘when 
carried out in this country’. Thus, where respondents expressed sympathy with the use of 
bombs, one can interpret their responses in terms of sympathy for the use of bombs in their 
own country (whether they understood this to be the UK, or one of its constituent parts). This 
arguably ‘raised the bar’ of what would count as sympathy for violent extremism, but 
 
4 This is a familiar argumentative manoeuvre known as the ‘Livingstone formulation’, i.e. ‘refusing to answer a 
charge of antisemitism by responding instead with a counter-charge that those who talk about antisemitism are 
really engaged in bad-faith efforts to silence criticism of Israel’ (Hirsh 2017, p. 6). When elaborated to this 
extent (i.e. accusations of a propaganda campaign), it arguably amounts to a conspiracy theory. This form of 
discourse is currently very common on the far left. One of the revolutionary socialist platforms that we 
examined was engaged both in an attempt to argue that leftist analysis requires the rejection of conspiracy 
theories, especially around the issue of Israel and Palestine (Rees 2019), and in the simultaneous promulgation 
of the idea that media reports of antisemitic incidents involving left-wing political figures are part of a 
‘propaganda campaign… to eviscerate any possibility of a socialist British Prime Minister, sympathetic to the 
Palestinian struggle’ (Bryan 2019, n.p.).  
5 Note that, on the far left, the word ‘democratic’ does not imply representative electoral democracy. For 
example, a Weekly Worker article argues for the desirability of ‘form[ing the working class] into armed and 
democratic popular militias’ (Parker 2008, n.p.). 
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removed any potential ambiguity around whether the additional SyFoR item could have been 
used to express support for pro-democracy protestors in authoritarian states. In order to assess 
adherence to something resembling the ‘anti-imperialist’ geopolitical outlook of the sectarian 
far left, a further multiple choice question presented respondents with a list of seven countries 
and asked them to choose those that they considered to be ‘the greatest threat to world peace’. 
Regarding the sampling strategy, our assumption was not that people identifying themselves 
as ‘very left-wing’ can all be assumed to be members or fellow travellers of the sectarian far 
left. Rather, it was that members and fellow travellers of the sectarian far left will tend to 
identify themselves as ‘very left-wing’, and that we would therefore be likely to sample more 
of them in this way than through random sampling of the general population. It is important 
to emphasise that this sample was not a self-selecting or convenience sample such as might 
have been obtained through social media: YouGov primarily recruits panellists through non-
political third-party websites and incentivises participation; moreover, the great majority of 
its surveys are non-political.  
Where responses to items were expressed in relation to a common scale (e.g. representing 
levels of agreement and disagreement), it was possible to present them in a random order. 
Possible responses to multiple-choice questions were also presented in a random order. 
2.3 Stage three: nationally-representative survey of British adults 
In the third stage, a shorter questionnaire was presented to a much larger, nationally-
representative sample of British adults. This questionnaire comprised: 
• The modified SyFoR scale discussed above (with items again presented in a random 
order), and 
• Five items selected from the shortlist of 15 new items used in the previous survey. 
These were chosen on the basis of factor analysis and presented in a random order on 
a separate page 
In measuring levels of agreement with revolutionary workerism in the ‘very left-wing’ 
sample, we used only the same five items that were presented to the nationally-representative 
sample, with the remainder being ignored. In this way, we were able to use the dataset 
collected by surveying the ‘very left-wing’ first as a pilot for the revolutionary workerism 
inventory, and then as a boost sample for the nationally-representative survey, increasing the 
sensitivity of our analysis by providing us with larger numbers of data points representing 
respondents at the more ‘workerist’ end of the ideological spectrum. See section 3.2 for lists 
of items. 
In addition, two further items assessed: 
• Attitudes to the same list of countries with which members of the far-left sample had 
been presented (again in a random order), and 
• Attitudes to ‘revolutionary socialist groups’, ‘British nationalist groups’, and ‘private 
sector’ or ‘profit-making’ companies (identified as such and presented in a random 
order) 
Fieldwork for the first survey was carried out from 12-17 April 2019. The sample (N = 1074) 
was stratified in accordance with YouGov’s estimate of the demographic characteristics of 
self-identified ‘very left-wing’ British adults based on very large nationally-representative 
sample surveys at the time of the last general election. Fieldwork for the second survey was 
carried out by YouGov on 24-25 and 28-29 April 2019 as part of that company’s daily 
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political omnibus poll, which aims to produce a nationally-representative stratified random 
sample of British adults (N = 3823). 
2.4 Stage four: analysis 
The primary object of the current study is to discover whether a relationship exists between 
openness to sectarian far-left ideology and sympathy for violent extremist tactics. 
The existence of a relationship between sympathy for violent extremism measured using the 
modified SyFoR scale and choice of countries as threats to world peace (hypotheses 1a and 
1b) can be assessed using Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests. The existence of a relationship 
between probability of sympathising with violent extremism as measured in the same way 
and the new measure of adherence to the belief system promoted by sectarian far-left groups 
(hypothesis 2) can be assessed through binomial logistic regression. For the purpose of 
testing the first of these relationships, the samples will be kept separate, as it is anticipated 
that the self-identified ‘very left-wing’ may have a different level of sympathy for violent 
extremism than the members of the nationally-representative political omnibus sample, which 
could obscure differences between mean levels among those within each sample who do and 
do not regard particular countries as threats to world peace relative to one another. For the 
purpose of testing the second, the two samples will be combined to produce a nationally-
representative random sample augmented with a substantial ‘boost sample’ of self-identified 
‘very left-wing’ respondents. This will increase the sensitivity of the analysis by providing 
what are anticipated to be larger absolute numbers of respondents at higher levels of 
agreement with the ideology disseminated by the sectarian far left. 
2.5 Technical note 
Analysis of findings was carried out using R version 3.5.1 (2018-07-02) with the packages 
psych (Revelle 2018), survey (Lumley 2004), wCorr (Emad and Bailey 2017), Hmisc 
(Harrell 2018), BBmisc (Bischl et al 2017), plyr (Wickham 2011), dplyr (Wickham et al 
2019), and purrr (Henry and Wickham 2019). For visualisation, we additionally used the 
packages ggplot2 (Wickham 2016) and ggcorrplot (Kassambara 2018). Initial generation of 
tables was with the packages knitr (Xie 2015) and kableExtra (Zhu 2019). Demographic 
weights were calculated by YouGov and used throughout the study except where otherwise 
stated. Where numbers of observations (N) are cited, these are unweighted counts and may 
not precisely match the corresponding percentages, which are calculated on the basis of 
weighted counts and rounded to the nearest whole number. All correlation coefficients 
reported in this document are Spearman rank-order coefficients calculated using weighted 
data. 
  
   13 
3. Measuring revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent 
extremism 
3.1 Piloting and factor analysis of new questionnaire items 
As discussed in section 2.2, Table 1 presents the statements with which members of the ‘very 
left-wing’ sample were presented in order to develop and pilot test the new survey instrument 
for measuring adherence to the ideology disseminated by the sectarian far left. Levels of 
agreement with these statements are also presented in figure 1. A total of 12 of the new items 
attracted agreement from over 50% of the ‘very left-wing’ sample, with only three attracting 
agreement from less than 50%. These were ‘Terrorists carry out attacks in the UK because of 
British Government policy’, ‘Parliamentary politics are a dead end’, and ‘I stand in solidarity 
with all targets of US military action’. The latter of these three was the only statement of the 
15 to receive more disagreement than agreement overall. These items accordingly appear to 
have good face validity in capturing agreement with ideas circulating among the self-
described ‘very left-wing’. 
Figure 2 gives the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient for each pair of items. These 
coefficients give a measure of how similar people’s responses to each pair of items tended to 
be, with higher numbers indicating a stronger tendency for those members of the sample who 
agree with one item to agree with the other. Factor analysis works on the assumption that a 
single underlying tendency or ‘factor’ may be reflected in answers to multiple questions. The 
first thing that we have to establish is how many such factors we would need to hypothesise 
in order to explain the variation in the data. The scree plot in figure 3 is an approach to 
answering this. It suggests that a single factor is sufficient: that is, that members of the 
sample can be treated as expressing a single tendency in their responses to all 15 items. 
However, responses to some items may express this tendency more clearly than others, and it 
is those items that we will want to focus on in order to measure that tendency efficiently. 
To discover which items these are, we look at their factor loadings (i.e. their correlations with 
the single hypothetical variable assumed to underlie responses to all of them). Table 2 shows 
the factor loadings for all fifteen questionnaire items. The item with the highest loading was 
fl.riseup (i.e. ‘I would like to see workers rise up against their bosses’) and item with the least 
was fl.zionism (‘Zionism is a form of racism’). To reiterate, these were not the most and least 
popular items in the survey, but the items whose responses were most and least predictive of 
responses to all other items. So, for example, fl.zionism received agreement or strong 
agreement from more than half the sample of self-declared ‘very left-wing’ respondents, but 
the extent to which a given respondent agreed or disagreed with it tells us relatively little 
about the extent to which he or she was likely to agree or disagree with other items in the list. 
Indeed, the most popular item overall, i.e. ‘We must drive fascists off the streets’, had only 
the seventh highest factor loading. This is not surprising: it will be seen below that far-right 
groups are perceived negatively throughout society as a whole. Thus, while far-left sectarian 
groups have a very specific understanding of what fascism is and why it should be opposed 
(see section 1.2), opposition to fascism may in and of itself be unable to play any particular 
role in distinguishing those groups and their supporters from anyone else. The two items 
which appeared to serve that purpose best (i.e. which were most correlated with the 
underlying factor) both concerned the need for a proletarian revolt against the capitalist order: 
fl.riseup (‘I would like to see workers rise up against their bosses’) and fl.capitalism 
(‘Capitalism is essentially bad and must be destroyed’).  
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Table 1: Statements reflecting aspects of the ideology of the sectarian far left 
Item Statement 
fl.farright The greatest threat to democracy has always come from the far right 
fl.strike We should always support striking workers 
fl.deadend Parliamentary politics are a dead end 
fl.capitalism Capitalism is essentially bad and must be destroyed 
fl.industry Industry should produce for need and not for profit 
fl.terror Terrorists carry out attacks in the UK because of British government policy 
fl.zionism Zionism is a form of racism 
fl.targets I stand in solidarity with all targets of US military action 
fl.fascists We must drive fascists off the streets 
fl.replace The current political system can’t be reformed - it must be replaced 
fl.revolution This country needs revolutionary change 
fl.msm.lies Mainstream newspapers and TV channels tell lies to protect the ruling class 
fl.wealthy.worse The wealthy make life worse for the rest of us 
fl.riseup I would like to see workers rise up against their bosses 
fl.protest Protesting against the Government makes the world a better place 
 
 
Figure 1: Agreement with statements expressing aspects of the ideology of the sectarian far left (‘very left-wing’ sample) 
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Figure 2: Correlations between statements (‘very left-wing’ sample) 
 
Figure 3: Scree plot of factors explaining variance in agreement with statements (‘very left-wing’ sample) 
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Table 2: Factor loadings (‘very left-wing’ sample)  
Item Factor loading 
fl.riseup 0.74 
fl.capitalism 0.69 
fl.revolution 0.65 
fl.wealthy.worse 0.61 
fl.industry 0.60 
fl.strike 0.58 
fl.fascists 0.51 
fl.protest 0.50 
fl.replace 0.50 
fl.msm.lies 0.48 
fl.farright 0.48 
fl.terror 0.45 
fl.targets 0.29 
fl.deadend 0.29 
fl.zionism 0.27 
3.2 The revolutionary workerist and modified SyFoR inventories 
On the basis of the above analysis, five items were chosen as a measure of alignment with the 
complex of ideas disseminated by far-left sectarian groups. These comprised all those items 
with a factor loading of 0.60 or more, and are for convenience listed in table 3. We refer to 
these as the ‘revolutionary workerist’ inventory because all items relate to the narrative that 
the current ‘capitalist’ social order is bad and that the people who do well out of it are the 
enemy of the workers, who should rise up against their bosses in a revolution and replace 
capitalism with a new system in which the profit motive is abandoned in favour of a sense of 
the common good. We note that, while one of the primary purposes of this study will be to 
discover whether or not there is a relationship between adherence to this ideology and 
sympathy for violent extremism, there would clearly be grounds for viewing revolutionary 
workerism as extremist in its own right: if sincerely adopted as a belief system, it would 
imply scapegoating, mistrust of existing institutions, and de-emphasis on effective forms of 
civic engagement in favour of utopian hopes for a future transformation of society. 
Although there were no items among the five that related to the ideology of ‘anti-
imperialism’ (see section 1.2), we were still able to measure alignment with the dominant 
geopolitical worldview on the sectarian far left using a separate multiple-choice question. 
Accurate measurement of the sectarian far-left variety of ‘anti-fascism’ (as defined in section 
1.2) was considered to be impossible at this stage: as explained, the high levels of agreement 
but relatively low factor loading of fl.fascists and fl.farright ruled both items out of the 
revolutionary workerist inventory. For this reason, we suggest that it would be desirable to  
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Table 3: Revolutionary workerist inventory 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
 
Item 
RevWork1 Capitalism is essentially bad and must be destroyed  
RevWork2 Industry should produce for need and not for profit 
RevWork3 This country needs revolutionary change 
RevWork4 The wealthy make life worse for the rest of us 
RevWork5 I would like to see workers rise up against their bosses  
 
Table 4: Modified SyFoR inventory (adapted from Bhui, Warfa, and Jones 2014) 
To what extent do you sympathise with or condemn the following actions when carried out in this 
country? 
 SyFoR1 Violence as part of political protests 
SyFoR2 Threatening to commit terrorist acts 
SyFoR3 Organising radical terrorist groups without personally taking part 
SyFoR4 Committing terrorist acts 
SyFoR5 Using bombs to fight injustice 
SyFoR6 Street violence against anti-democratic groups 
 
develop and pilot a separate instrument in order to distinguish individuals who reject fascism 
for non-radical reasons (e.g. because they believe in such concepts as racial equality, human 
rights, and the rule of law) from those who reject it for radical leftist reasons (i.e. because 
they see fascism as an obstacle to proletarian revolution). 
All five statements were at the level of objectives and broad ideological statements: items 
mentioning the specific tactics of protest and strike were less strongly correlated and 
therefore not included in the inventory. On the other hand, this arguably provided for a 
cleaner comparison between the revolutionary workerist inventory and the SyFoR inventory, 
as the presence of tactics in both of the two inventories might have served to exaggerate or 
disguise any relationship between them. As explained in section 2.2, the SyFoR inventory 
was modified in order to switch an explicitly Islamist tactic for one more likely to be 
endorsed by non-Islamists. For the full list of items used, see table 4. 
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4. Description of samples 
4.1 The characteristics of the ‘very left-wing’ 
Comparison of the demographic characteristics of the two samples give us a picture of the 
likely characteristics of British people who self-identify as ‘very left-wing’. As table 5 shows, 
the two samples are (after weighting) very similar with regard to gender and ethnicity, but 
members of the ‘very left-wing’ sample were substantially younger, more highly educated, 
far more likely to have voted Remain in the 2016 EU membership referendum, and (insofar 
as this is reflected in NRS social grade) rather more middle class. The high level of Remain 
voting supports our initial supposition that a survey of the self-declared ‘very left-wing’ will 
capture many respondents uninvolved with the sectarian far left: most revolutionary socialist 
groups in the UK campaigned for Leave and, across Europe, the far left tends to be associated 
with Euroscepticism (Fagerholm 2016).  
It appears likely that, amongst those British adults who see themselves as ‘very left-wing’, 
one will find both members and supporters of sectarian far-left groups that view the EU as an 
obstacle to socialist revolution and the young, highly-educated, metropolitan social liberals 
amongst whom support for EU membership is strongest. Of course, the latter also comprise 
one of the main constituencies within which the sectarian far left has historically been able to 
recruit. In 1972, for example, the Socialist Workers Party found that, among its 2098 
members, there were as many as 725 ‘white collar workers’ and a total of 432 school and 
college students, but only 613 ‘manual workers’, 109 unemployed people, and a mere four 
individuals who had retired due to old age (Rayner 1979, p. 222). 
28% of members of the ‘very left-wing’ sample identified themselves as members of the 
Labour Party, while 5% identified themselves as members of the Green Party, and 16% 
identified themselves as members of trade unions, although equivalent figures were not 
available for the political omnibus sample due to cost constraints. 51% reported that they read 
the Guardian or the Observer, while very small percentages reported that they read the 
publications of the sectarian far left, with 5% reporting that they read the Socialist Worker, 
3% reporting that they read the Socialist, and 1% each reporting that they read Counterfire, 
Solidarity, and the Weekly Worker. 
Members of the ‘very left-wing’ sample were also asked to select the generic groups they 
considered most supportive of their political views from a list of seven. Respondents could 
choose up to three, with the groups in the list comprising: ‘revolutionary socialist groups’, 
‘British nationalist groups’, ‘Christian groups’, ‘Jewish groups’, ‘Muslim groups’, ‘black 
groups’, and ‘gay and lesbian groups’. ‘Revolutionary socialist groups’ were the most 
popular option, selected by 44% of the ‘very left-wing’ sample. This option was followed in 
popularity by ‘feminist groups’ (42%) and ‘gay and lesbian groups’ (34%). In addition to an 
identification with socially liberal politics, this finding suggests a widespread identification 
with the organised far left that might be considered inconsistent with lack of readership of its 
publications. British nationalist groups predictably came last (chosen by just 1%).6 
 
 
6 YouGov updates its demographic variables periodically, and all respondents will have been asked to place 
themselves on its left-right political scale at a date no more than six months prior to the collection of data for 
this study. That even 1% of ‘very left-wing’ respondents should regard ‘British nationalist’ groups as politically 
supportive is surprising, but it seems possible that the individuals in question may have undergone an 
ideological journey from left to right in the last six months – or alternatively that they did not understand one or 
both of the terms ‘British nationalist’ and ‘very left-wing’. 
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Table 5: Demographic characteristics of the ‘very left-wing’ and nationally-representative omnibus samples 
 
4.2 Explicit indicators of support for radical politics within the general population 
Before focusing on the ideological tendencies that it was our primary purpose to measure and 
analyse, it is worth presenting some further descriptive statistics with regard to the nationally-
representative political omnibus sample, as these will help to shed light both on how typical 
or atypical it is for a British adult to identify as ‘very left-wing’ and on how typical British 
adults might feel about the sectarian far left and the forces against which it pits itself. 
As table 6 shows, the most common response to YouGov’s regular request for placement on a 
left-right scale was to avoid answering, while the second most-common response was to 
answer by placing oneself in the centre. The dominance of the centre is also seen in figure 4, 
which visualises the frequency of non-missing answers. More respondents identified 
themselves as ‘slightly’ to the left or right of the centre than as ‘fairly’ left- or right-wing. 
And far more identified themselves in any of these ways than placed themselves at either of 
the scale’s extremes, each of which was chosen by no more than about 3% of the sample. In 
other words, an overwhelming majority of respondents either declined to place themselves on 
the scale, or placed themselves somewhere near the centre of it. It would thus appear that the 
proportion of British adults who understand themselves to be ‘very left-wing’ or ‘very right-
wing’ is likely to be very, very small. If these are social or cultural identities, then they are 
identities that only appeal to very small minorities. To speculate about the demographics for 
which the ‘very right-wing’ identity has the strongest appeal would be outside the scope of 
this study, but section 4.1 has already given a clear idea as to the demographic groups whose 
members would appear most inclined to claim a ‘very left-wing’ identity for themselves. 
Table 7 and figure 5 give an idea of how the population as a whole views the proponents of 
extreme left- and right-wing politics. When asked to express their view of ‘revolutionary 
socialist’ groups and ‘British nationalist’ groups on a five-point scale running from ‘very 
positive’ to ‘very negative’, the majority response in each case was ‘very negative’, while the 
second most popular response was either ‘somewhat negative’ or ‘neither positive nor 
negative’, and the third most popular was ‘don’t know’. Only 9-10% of respondents stated 
that they had a positive view of such groups, with a mere 2% of the sample choosing ‘very 
 
 ‘Very left-wing’ sample 
Mean and standard deviation or 
percentage 
Political omnibus sample 
Mean and standard deviation or 
percentage 
Age 39.1 (15.8) 48.4 (17.2) 
Gender: Female 52 52 
Ethnicity: White (any) 93 94 
NRS social grade: ABC1 68 57 
Degree-level education 44 28 
Voted Leave 10 41 
Voted Remain 74 38 
N 1074 3823 
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Table 6: Left-right political identity (nationally-representative omnibus sample) 
Self-placement on left-right scale Percentage N 
Very left-wing 3 121 
Fairly left-wing 13 520 
Slightly left-of-centre 15 586 
Centre 18 700 
Slightly right-of-centre 14 534 
Fairly right-wing 9 348 
Very right-wing 2 60 
None 27 954 
 
 
Figure 4: Left-right political identity (nationally-representative omnibus sample) 
positive’ for either. These findings would suggest that ‘revolutionary socialist’ groups are 
less unpopular than ‘British nationalist’ groups, but that neither of the two would be likely to 
win mass support without rebranding. 
Given the centrality of anti-capitalism to far-left ideology, we also asked about ‘private sector 
companies’ (24-25 April wave) and ‘profit-making companies’ (28-29 April wave); see table 
8 and figure 6. In each case, the most common response was ‘neither positive nor negative’, 
followed by ‘somewhat positive’. ‘Very negative’ was the least common, falling not only 
below ‘very positive’ but also below ‘don’t know’. There is thus little evidence for 
widespread rejection of those who operate within the market economy – despite some 
evidence that the word ‘socialism’ is now regarded slightly more positively than the word 
‘capitalism’ in the UK (Dahlgreen 2016; see also section 5.2, below). 
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Table 7: Views of ‘revolutionary socialist’ and ‘British nationalist’ groups (nationally-representative omnibus sample) 
View  ‘Revolutionary socialist’ groups  ‘British nationalist’ groups 
 Percentage N Percentage N 
Very positive 2  61 2  71 
Somewhat positive 8 321 7  239 
Neither positive nor negative 21 804 17  643 
Somewhat negative 20 799 17  655 
Very negative 32 1250 43  1731 
Don’t know 17 588 14  484 
 
 
Figure 5: Views of ‘revolutionary socialist’ and ‘British nationalist’ groups (nationally-representative omnibus sample) 
 
 
 
The typical British adult would thus appear to feel positive or indifferent towards private 
enterprise, to feel very negative towards both the ‘revolutionary socialist’ far left and the 
‘British nationalist’ far right, and to be very unlikely to see him- or herself either as ‘very left-
wing’ or as ‘very right-wing’. On this level, the organisational scope for anything readily 
identifiable as ‘far-left extremism’ would appear to be somewhat limited. Our primary focus, 
however, is not on the direct influence of the sectarian far left, but on the influence of the 
ideology it promotes. 
  
View of 'revolutionary socialist' groups View of 'British nationalist' groups
Ve
ry 
neg
ativ
e
So
me
wh
at n
ega
tive
Ne
ithe
r p
osi
tive
 no
r n
ega
tive
So
me
wh
at p
osi
tive
Ve
ry 
pos
itiv
e
Ve
ry 
neg
ativ
e
So
me
wh
at n
ega
tive
Ne
ithe
r p
osi
tive
 no
r n
ega
tive
So
me
wh
at p
osi
tive
Ve
ry 
pos
itiv
e
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
   22 
Table 8: Views of ‘private sector’ and ‘profit-making’ companies (nationally-representative omnibus sample) 
View  ‘Private sector’ companies  ‘Profit-making’ companies 
 Percentage N Percentage N 
Very positive 7  139 9 191 
Somewhat positive 26 449 27 572 
Neither positive nor negative 34 594 35 749 
Somewhat negative 15 266 14 282 
Very negative 5 81 6 124 
Don’t know 13 201 9 175 
 
 
Figure 6: Views of ‘private sector’ and ‘profit-making’ companies (nationally-representative omnibus sample) 
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5. Revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent extremism 
across both samples 
5.1 Reliability of measures and distribution of scores 
Tables 9 and 10 present standard measures of internal reliability, as well as mean values and 
standard deviations, for the revolutionary workerist and modified SyFoR inventories. Both on 
Cronbach’s alpha and Guttman’s lambda 6, the two instruments achieved a satisfactory level 
of internal reliability in both samples. Figure 7 shows the distributions of overall scores for 
revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent extremism for each sample. 
 
Table 9: Revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent extremism (‘very left-wing’ sample) 
Measure α λ6 M SD 
Revolutionary workerism 0.80 0.77 4.03 0.72 
SyFoR 0.87 0.88 1.60 0.78 
 
Table 10: Revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent extremism (nationally-representative omnibus sample) 
Measure α λ6 M SD 
Revolutionary workerism 0.86 0.83 3.02 0.95 
SyFoR 0.84 0.83 1.25 0.53 
 
Figure 7: Revolutionary workerism and sympathy for violent extremism by sample 
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5.2 Levels of revolutionary workerism  
In the ‘very left-wing’ sample, the mean revolutionary workerism score corresponded to 
overall agreement with the five items, while the mean revolutionary workerism score in the 
political omnibus sample corresponded to the mid-point between agreement and 
disagreement. A weighted, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test shows the finding of 
greater revolutionary workerism in the ‘very left-wing’ sample to be very highly statistically 
significant (U = 34.27, DF = 4755, p < 0.001). 
Interestingly, there was no correlation between revolutionary workerism and positivity 
towards British nationalist groups within the nationally-representative political omnibus 
sample (rs = -0.03, DF = 3689, p = 0.068). This is consistent with the view that, while those in 
strong agreement with the ideas of the sectarian far left may have distinctive reasons for 
rejecting the organised far right (see section 1.2), they are no more likely reject it than most 
other people, because rejection of the organised far right is simply normal in contemporary 
Britain (see sections 3.1 and 4.2). 
On the other hand, there was a positive correlation between revolutionary workerism and 
positivity towards revolutionary socialist groups within the omnibus sample (rs = 0.32, DF = 
3689, p < 0.001). However, while 69% of members of that sample who expressed an opinion 
took a ‘somewhat negative’ or ‘very negative’ view of revolutionary socialist groups, just 
41% were in an overall position of disagreement with all five items in the revolutionary 
workerist inventory (i.e. had a revolutionary workerism score of less than 3.00). This 
suggests that the general British population is rather more open to the ideology which the 
sectarian far left disseminates than it is to the sectarian far left itself. 
To give an idea of what that this openness means in practice, 23% of members of the 
nationally-representative political omnibus sample agreed with the statement ‘Capitalism is 
essentially bad and must be destroyed’, while 45% agreed that ‘The wealthy make life worse 
for the rest of us’. While that is much lower than the 67% and 81% of members of the ‘very 
left-wing’ sample who agreed with the same statements (respectively), it remains a 
remarkably high level of agreement for a clear statement of revolutionary anti-capitalism and 
a conspiratorial view of the world in which social problems are blamed on a wealthy 
minority. 
5.3 Levels of sympathy for violent extremism 
The mean SyFoR score for both samples corresponds to condemnation of violent extremism. 
However, the mean score for the political omnibus sample was closer to strong condemnation 
than to condemnation ‘to some extent’, while the mean score for the ‘very left-wing’ sample 
was closer to condemnation ‘to some extent’ than to strong condemnation. A weighted, two-
tailed Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test shows the finding of greater sympathy for violent 
extremism in the ‘very left-wing’ sample to be very highly statistically significant (U = 
15.13, DF = 4702, p < 0.001). 
The mean differences between the samples may seem slight, but they reflect the fact that the 
‘very left-wing’ sample contained a much larger minority of respondents who were 
sympathetic to violent extremism. Table 11 shows the proportion of members of each sample 
who did and did not express sympathy with at least one form of violent extremism. 
Comparison of the two samples suggests that people who identify as ‘very left-wing’ are 
several times more likely to sympathise with violent extremism than members of the 
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population as a whole. This finding is very highly statistically significant (X 2 = 331.45, DF = 
1, p < 0.001).7 
To get an idea of what this means in practice, we can again look at specific items. 6% of 
members of the nationally-representative omnibus sample sympathised with the most popular 
modified SyFoR item, i.e. ‘street violence against anti-democratic groups’, while just 3% 
sympathised with ‘violence as part of political protests’, and the remaining items received 
sympathy from 1-3% of the sample. But 24% of members of the ‘very left-wing’ sample 
sympathised with ‘street violence against anti-democratic groups’, while 18% sympathised 
with ‘violence as part of political protests’, and the remaining items received sympathy from 
4-6% of the sample. 
Although such crude comparisons certainly indicate a greater likelihood of finding someone 
who sympathises with violent extremism among the self-consciously ‘very left-wing’ than 
among the general population, they also indicate that the great majority of individuals who 
identify as ‘very left-wing’ do not sympathise with violent extremism. However, our purpose 
in this study was not to compare those who do and those who do not identify as ‘very left-
wing’, but to investigate the relationship of aspects of sectarian far-left ideology to sympathy 
for violent extremism. We suggest that understanding this relationship may help to clarify 
why there are individuals who do and do not sympathise with violent extremism to be found 
both among those who understand their politics to be ‘very left-wing’ and among those who 
do not understand their politics in such a way. 
 
Table 11: Comparison of samples by individuals expressing sympathy with at least one form of violent extremism 
  Sample: Political omnibus  Sample: ‘Very left-wing’ 
 Percentage N Percentage N 
Sympathies: 0 91  3524 
 
71 767 
Sympathies: 1+ 9 299 29 307 
 
 
  
 
7 Chi-square test with unweighted counts. Note that ‘very left-wing’ members of the political omnibus sample 
were not excluded from the count. Thus, this is not a comparison between those who do and those who do not 
identify as ‘very left-wing’, but a comparison between those who identify as ‘very left-wing’ and the general 
population (which itself includes, as we saw in section 4.2, a very small proportion of individuals who identify 
as ‘very left-wing’). 
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6. Sympathy for violent extremism by geopolitical outlook 
As we have seen, agreement with the piloted statements designed to express a strong form of 
‘anti-imperialist’ ideology were not strongly correlated with items representing other aspects 
of far-left ideology, for which reason they were not included in the revolutionary workerist 
inventory. However, adherence to something resembling an ‘anti-imperialist’ worldview was 
assessed with a less direct question: ‘Which, if any, of the following countries represent the 
greatest threat to world peace?’ Presented in a random order, those countries were the US, the 
UK, Israel, North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran, and respondents could choose up to three. 
As explained in section 1.2, the first three of these countries, but not the remaining four, are 
seen as ‘imperialist’ by most of the sectarian far left, and accordingly targeted by Britain’s 
‘anti-war’ movement, which only opposes military action when carried out by those states 
that it recognises as great capitalist powers. We expected that levels of sympathy for violent 
extremism would be higher among those who chose countries that most of the sectarian far 
left would categorise as ‘imperialist’ than among those who did not. 
As table 12 shows, the characteristically ‘anti-imperialist’ categorisation of the US as a threat 
to world peace was adopted by three in every four members of the ‘very left-wing’ sample. 
Nearly one in three chose Israel, the third most popular choice. Interestingly, Russia was the 
second most popular choice after the US, selected by nearly half of respondents, which 
indicates that the self-identified ‘very left-wing’ may include a substantial proportion of 
individuals whose geopolitical views are not in alignment with the ‘anti-imperialism’ of most 
sectarian far-left groups.8 By contrast, table 13 shows that, in the nationally-representative 
political omnibus sample, the US was only the third most popular choice, falling below 
Russia and North Korea, while the bottom two choices were not the UK followed by Iran but 
Israel followed by the UK. This suggests that the ‘anti-imperialist’ worldview discussed 
above is far less common among the general population than it is among the self-described 
‘very left-wing’. 
Tables 12 and 13 also show the results of a series of weighted, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon tests comparing levels of sympathy for violent extremism among those who do and 
those who do not choose each country as a ‘greatest threat to world peace’. In the ‘very left-
wing’ sample, choosing Israel, the US, the UK, or (unexpectedly) China was associated with 
greater sympathy for violent extremism (statistically significant for China and the UK; very 
highly statistically significant for Israel and the US), while the choice of North Korea was 
associated with lesser sympathy for violent extremism (very highly statistically significant). 
Choosing Russia or Iran was associated with lesser sympathy for violent extremism, but this 
was not statistically significant. With regard to this sample, hypothesis 1a was therefore fully 
supported, while hypothesis 1b was supported in relation to North Korea only. 
In the nationally-representative political omnibus sample, the choice of the UK or the US as a 
threat to world peace was again associated with greater sympathy for violent extremism (very 
highly statistically significant), while the choice of Russia, North Korea, or Iran was 
associated with lesser sympathy for violent extremism (highly statistically significant for 
Russia; very highly significant for North Korea and Iran). The choices of Israel and China 
were associated with higher and lower sympathy (respectively), but this was not statistically 
significant. With regard to this sample, hypothesis 1a was therefore supported with regard to 
the UK and the US (but not Israel), while hypothesis 1b was supported with regard to Russia, 
North Korea, and Iran (but not China).  
 
8 In this connection, it may be worth recalling the high proportion of Remain voters noted in section 4.1. 
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Table 12: Countries regarded as ‘greatest threat to world peace’ (‘very left-wing’ sample) 
               SyFoR 
Greatest threat N Percentage MRS U p 
The US 802 75 +0.08 3.51 < 0.001 
Russia 515 48 -0.03 -1.51 0.130 
Israel 352 32 +0.07 3.35 < 0.001 
North Korea 314 29 -0.11 -5.70 < 0.001 
China 137 13 +0.06 2.10 0.036 
The UK 109 10 +0.07 2.10 0.036 
Iran 75 7 -0.07 -1.51 0.130 
None of these 22 2 +0.02 0.31 0.759 
Degrees of freedom: 1048 
 
Table 13: Countries regarded as ‘greatest threat to world peace’ (nationally-representative omnibus sample) 
               SyFoR 
Greatest threat N Percentage MRS U p 
Russia 1998 51 -0.03 -2.68 0.007 
North Korea 1642 42 -0.04 -3.79 < 0.001 
The US 1226 32 +0.04 3.58 < 0.001 
Iran 940 25 -0.04 -4.31 < 0.001 
China 757 20 -0.02 -1.85 0.065 
Israel 495 13 +0.01 1.02 0.309 
The UK 64 2 +0.23 4.79 < 0.001 
None of these 115 3 +0.06 1.69 0.090 
 
Degrees of freedom: 3652 
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7. Sympathy for violent extremism by revolutionary workerism 
In order to test hypothesis 2, the two samples were combined together, and logistic regression 
was used to estimate the probability that an individual will sympathise with at least one form 
of violent extremism, given that individual’s level of agreement with the items in the 
revolutionary workerist inventory. We found an individual’s agreement with revolutionary 
workerist ideas to provide a strong and highly statistically significant indicator of the 
likelihood that he or she will sympathise with one or more forms of violent extremism, even 
after demographic controls. Thus, hypothesis 2 was supported. 
Table 14 presents a percentage breakdown by gender, mean age, and mean level of 
revolutionary workerism for individuals who do and do not sympathise with at least one of 
the forms of violent extremism in the SyFoR inventory. Table 15 presents the same 
information for SyFoR items 3-5 only, these being the most obviously dangerous forms of 
violent extremism of the six: namely, actual rather than threatened terrorist actions, 
organisation of ‘radical terrorist groups’, and ‘using bombs to fight injustice’. 
Tables 16 and 17 present the coefficients for a total of four binomial logistic regression 
models, with table 16 modelling the probability of sympathy with any SyFoR item and table 
17 modelling the probability of sympathy with any of SyFoR items 3-5 only. Each table 
presents the coefficients for two models, the first with radical workerism as the sole predictor, 
and the second with age and gender as demographic controls. In order to facilitate 
comparison, age was standardised to the range 1-5, with 1 corresponding to the age of the 
youngest members of the two samples and 5 corresponding to the age of the oldest members 
of the two samples. All of these predictors were found to be very highly statistically 
significant with regard to both sets of SyFoR items, with radical workerism increasing the 
probability that an individual will sympathise with violent extremism, and age and female 
gender reducing it. 
 
Table 14: Comparison of sympathisers and non-sympathisers, SyFoR 1-6 
             Gender (%)       Age Rev. workerism 
Sympathies N Female Male M SD M SD 
0 4291 54 46 47.49 17.26 3.14 0.97 
1+ 606 34 66 39.10 16.00 3.90 0.93 
Table 15: Comparison of sympathisers and non-sympathisers, SyFoR 3-5 
             Gender (%)       Age Rev. workerism 
Sympathies N Female Male M SD M SD 
0 4712 53 47 46.81 17.28 3.22 0.99 
1+ 185 32 68 36.95 15.66 3.80 0.97 
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If we consider levels of revolutionary workerism only and ignore controls, then we would 
estimate that an individual at the lowest level of revolutionary workerism would have about a 
2% chance of sympathising with any form of violent extremism and about a 1% chance of 
sympathising with one or more of the most obviously dangerous forms of violent extremism, 
but that these would rise to about 36% and about 11% respectively for an individual at the 
highest level of revolutionary workerism. 
However, the demographic controls make a substantial difference to an individual’s estimated 
chances of sympathising. For example, a woman in her nineties is estimated to have only a 
9% chance of sympathising with one or more of SyFoR 1-6 and a 1% chance of sympathising 
with one or more of SyFoR 3-5 even at the highest level of revolutionary workerism, while a 
man of 18 at the same level of revolutionary workerism is estimated to have a 56% chance of 
sympathising with one or more of SyFoR 1-6 and a 22% chance of sympathising with one or 
more of SyFoR 3-5. At the lowest level of revolutionary workerism, a man of that age is 
estimated to have only a 5% chance of sympathising with one of the forms of violent 
extremism covered by SyFoR 1-6 and a 4% chance of sympathising with one of those 
covered by SyFoR 3-5, while a woman in her nineties is estimated to have virtually no 
chance of sympathising with any form of violent extremism whatsoever. 
 
 
 
Table 16: Regression coefficients, SyFoR 1-6 
 Model I Model II 
 Estimate SE t p Estimate SE t p 
(Intercept) -5.01 0.21 -23.86 < 0.001 -3.25 0.26 -12.46 < 0.001 
Rev. workerism 0.89 0.05 16.50 < 0.001 0.78 0.05 14.63 < 0.001 
Age     -0.42 0.05 -7.60 < 0.001 
Gender: Female     -0.92 0.09 -9.70 < 0.001 
Residual degrees of freedom (model I): 4755; Residual degrees of freedom (model II): 4753 
Table 17: Regression coefficients, SyFoR 3-5 
           Model I     Model II 
 Estimate SE t p Estimate SE t p 
(Intercept) -5.36 0.32 -16.99 < 0.001 -3.14 0.40 -7.87 < 0.001 
Rev. workerism 0.65 0.08 7.97 < 0.001 0.49 0.08 6.14 < 0.001 
Age     -0.58 0.09 -6.36 < 0.001 
Gender: Female     -0.90 0.15 -5.85 < 0.001 
Residual degrees of freedom (model I): 4755; Residual degrees of freedom (model II): 4753 
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Figure 8 visualises the relationship between revolutionary workerism and sympathy for 
violent extremism on the basis of Model I for SyFoR 1-6 and Model I for SyFoR 3-5 (i.e. 
without controls). The black line shows the estimated chance of sympathising with at least 
one form of violent extremism and the grey ribbon shows the 95% confidence interval for the 
estimate, while the red bubbles show the actual rate of sympathy for members of the sample 
at each level of revolutionary workerism (rounded to the nearest 0.25). As the bubbles show, 
the estimated percentage chances are very close to the actual percentage frequencies at which 
individuals across the scale of revolutionary workerism were observed to sympathise with 
violent extremism. 
 
 
Figure 8: Percentage chance of sympathising and observed proportion of sympathisers by level of revolutionary workerism 
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8. Conclusion 
This is a first set of summary findings from a new and unique dataset. We provide estimates 
of levels of agreement with revolutionary workerist principles, adoption of a geopolitical 
outlook resembling the ‘anti-imperialism’ of the sectarian far left, and sympathy for violent 
extremism both among those self-identifying as ‘very left-wing’ and among the wider British 
population. More importantly, we also provide estimates of the relationships between 
sympathy for violent extremism and the two aforementioned ideological tendencies.  
Our findings suggest that although very few British adults identify as ‘very left-wing’ or have 
a ‘very positive’ view of ‘revolutionary socialist groups’, there are much larger numbers who 
are in a position of agreement with regard to salient components of the revolutionary 
workerist ideology expressed in the publications of the sectarian far left. Moreover, our 
findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between sympathy for violent extremism 
and both revolutionary workerism and an ‘anti-imperialist’ geopolitical outlook. 
The probability of sympathising with at least one form of violent extremism was found to 
increase with level of agreement with revolutionary workerist ideology. It was also found to 
decrease with age, and to be higher among males than among females, such that young males 
in strong agreement with revolutionary workerism are estimated to be at a particularly high 
risk of sympathising. Moreover, with the exception of the positive finding with regard to 
China among the ‘very left-wing’ (which was at the lowest level of statistical significance), 
our findings were consistent with the expectation that those with a geopolitical outlook 
resembling the sectarian far-left ideology of ‘anti-imperialism’ would be more sympathetic to 
violent extremism than those with a geopolitical outlook that does not. 
While political violence is now relatively rare in Britain, our findings suggest that 
opportunities may exist for political entrepreneurs to radicalise those open to revolutionary 
workerism and ‘anti-imperialism’. We observe that capitalising on such opportunities would 
require strategies to recruit outside the ecological niche currently occupied by sectarian far-
left groups, although we note that online media can potentially provide a dissemination and 
recruitment infrastructure that bypasses traditional channels (see Gerbaudo 2018 on populist 
exploitation of this approach). Further research will be necessary to establish the role of the 
Internet in the dissemination of the ideologies studied here. But given the possibilities that 
now exist for political mobilisation without the need for a conventional party structure, we 
suggest that the generally negative public image of the organised radical left may in the long 
term prove to be a lesser drag on the political potential of radical left-wing ideas than the 
British public’s clear lack of antipathy towards private enterprise. 
To reiterate, we see no evidence that sectarian groups on the British far left currently have the 
capacity or the inclination for direct organisational involvement in terror activities of any 
sort. But even without the connection to violent extremism, the revolutionary workerist 
ideology that such groups promote may from a certain point of view be considered extremist 
in and of itself, as it has the clear potential to damage political trust and to discourage 
individuals from taking part in more effective modes of civic engagement. The implication of 
the five statements that make up the revolutionary workerist inventory is that civilisation as it 
now exists is so irredeemably corrupt that the most valuable and authentic form of 
engagement with it is to seek its destruction and replacement. This is an anti-civic ideology 
promoted by groups that are characterised by extreme scepticism towards electoral 
democracy and the rule of law, and that devote themselves to interfering in civil society 
organisations for the sake of utopian long-term goals that will never be achieved. 
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Moreover, while the effects of sectarian far-left group activity are likely to be mitigated by 
the unpopularity and small size of the groups themselves, we would caution against 
dismissing the possibility of increased prominence for individuals and organisations 
espousing similar ideologies when recent years have seen notable successes for political 
entrepreneurs mobilising support on the basis of ideas hitherto seen as the territory of the 
radical right (see Ford and Goodwin 2014). Electoral success for an equivalent movement on 
the left could have far-reaching consequences. It has been suggested that those with a 
psychological need for ‘leaders who must be obeyed’, ‘enemies who must be ruined’, and 
‘ “party discipline” that must be followed’ turned away from the political left in the late 20th 
century because they ‘kn[e]w which way the wind [was] blowing’ – i.e. because they 
recognised that there was no realistic chance of overthrowing the actually-existing social 
order (Altemeyer 1996, pp. 219-220 and 229). It is conceivable that a populist movement 
employing revolutionary workerist rhetoric might have the potential to reverse this 
hypothetical trend by providing authoritarians of that stripe with a left-wing outlet whose 
prospects appeared more plausibly encouraging than those of the current sectarian far left. 
Given the findings reported here, it seems plausible that such an eventuality might be 
accompanied by the mainstreaming of sympathy for certain forms of violent extremism. 
The evidence of this study is that a relationship exists between sympathy for violent 
extremism and the ideas promulgated by the sectarian far left. Even without the direct 
promotion of violence, we suggest that beliefs of that nature could plausibly provide 
vulnerable individuals with a motivation to break the law, potentially putting themselves and 
others in danger. In that context, we note that the most lethal examples of recent terrorist 
actions from the far right have been perpetrated not by organised fascist groups but by ‘lone 
wolf’ attackers radicalised through exposure to ideologies circulating online (see Pantucci 
2011 and Berntzen and Sandberg 2014 for analysis of the most intensively studied case). The 
findings of this study give no reason to assume that left-wing ideas would be incapable of 
playing an analogous role. 
With the political landscape in a state of flux, it would be prudent to monitor for all 
developments carefully. 
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